Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to an electronic seal capable of monitoring its own security state, for example an electronic seal for securing in a closed position a door or other closure closing an aperture allowing access to an enclosed space (e.g. a container). The invention also includes a seal capable of communicating with a reading and/or programming device.
2. Description of the Related Art
There exists a need to monitor the security status of cables, bands or other elongate members which form a loop or other connection either of themselves or when one or both ends thereof are fixed to a lock or seal. In particular, if the continuity integrity of the loop, connection or elongate member is broken b tampering, e.g. by cutting the cable, band etc. or by releasing the cable from the lock/seal, then there is a need to detect this.
Various solutions to this problem have been proposed. For example, a recently publicised xe2x80x9celectronic tagxe2x80x9d for criminals (The Times 29th January 1999) emits coded electric pulses every few seconds by radio frequency. If the securing strap is broken or tampered with, an alert code is transmitted to the monitor which sends an alarm to a control station. If the tag moves out of range of a monitor, an alarm is also sent to the control station.
The Crypta III device marketed by Encrypta Electronics Ltd. UK and described in publications EP 0,193,297 A1 and B1 monitors the receipt and release of the releasable end of a security cable into/from a recess in a housing. A random code generated by the receipt or release is displayed via an LED. However, this device cannot detect its cable being cut.
There are numerous electronic seals (for example, Electronic Seal PTE Ltd, Singapore; Sealtronic SA, Switzerland) which check for electrical continuity of a standard steel rope or cable. Tampering is assumed to break the electrical continuity of a steel security cable. However, it is believed that the circuit could be kept intact with a simple shunt cable while cutting the security cable, in which case the tampering would probably not be detected by the seal. Information is transmitted by radio frequency.
An application note published in 1992 by Dallas Semiconductor describes a tamper detection circuit completed by a loop of wire which is the centre conductor of a coaxial cable. The electrical continuity of the centre conductor is thereby monitored This arrangement prevents keeping the circuit intact with a simple shunt cable connected to the outer conductor of the coaxial cable while cutting the cable. However, two problems remain with this arrangement. Firstly, as electrical contacts with the cable are involved, the device is susceptible to electrical noise or being damaged by deliberate voltage spikes being applied to the cable. Secondly, it is still feasible that a thief could carefully peel back the outer sheath and central insulation of the device to expose the central conducting core. Shunt cables could then be provided by the thief for both inner and outer conductors of the coaxial cable so that the cable could then be cut while maintaining the electrical continuity of the tamper detection circuit.
The present invention aims to mitigate or solve one or more of the problems associated with the above-mentioned prior art devices.
Additionally or alternatively, the present invention aims to provide an electronic seal or system capable of/adapted to monitor/sense the integrity and/or continuity of (i) a closure member (e.g. an elongate member such as a cable, band, padlock hook, etc.) comprised in the seal or system and/or (ii) a security loop or other connection including/involving part or all of the closure member.
Additionally or alternatively, the present invention aims to provide an electronic seal or system capable of/adapted to monitor/sense the integrity and/or continuity of (i) a closure member (e.g. an elongate member such as a cable, band, padlock hook, etc.) comprised in the seal or system and/or (ii) a security loop or other connection including/involving part or all of the closure member.
First Aspect of the Invention
According to a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic seal comprising:
a housing;
a closure member cooperable with the housing to form a connection to close the seal,
the closure member comprising an outer portion enclosing one or more inner cores; and
means for sensing the integrity and/or continuity of some or all of the one or more inner cores.
The inventive seal has an advantage over the prior art Scaltronic and Electronic Seal PTE devices, which sense the electrical continuity of a standard cable, in that it is an inner core of the closure member rather tan the whole of the closure member whose integrity/continuity is sensed. This means that it is more difficult for a thief to cut the cable without the tampering being detected. In particular, attaching a shunt cable to the outer portion of the closure member. before cutting the closure member, to allow access to a container secured by the seal, would result in maintained continuity in the outer portion but a discontinuity in the inner core which would be detected; in contrast this procedure would avoid tamper detection in the Sealtronic devices as electrical continuity would be maintained by the shunt cable.
The closure member is preferably an elongate member. This allows easy threading through a hole in a member to be secured by the seal (e.g. a hole in a lug in a container closure mechanism). Also, the present invention is more useful with an elongate member which is more likely to be cut (see below).
The outer portion is merely limited by its enclosing one or more inner cores, and can include a or the central axis (which can be curved) of the closure member or elongate member when this is not occupied by the one or more inner cores.
Preferably, the connection is formed by formation of a closed loop including part or all of the closure member. The loop can be any shape, not merely a curved shape. Two or more portions (e.g. end portions) of the closure member (e.g. elongate member) can be connected to the housing to form the loop.
In an alternative embodiment, when the connection is formed only one portion (e.g. an end portion) of the closure member (e.g. a rigid or flexible elongate member, e.g. a bolt or cable) is connected to the housing. The closure member here preferably comprises an enlarged head (e.g. bolt head) attached to one end of an elongate portion (e.g. shaft, shank, cable etc) of narrower cross-section containing the inner core(s), an opposing end of the elongate portion being adapted to be received (e.g. by means of a screw connection) by a recess of the housing. For example, the inner corc(s) can comprise an optical fibre, one end of which is mirrored at the enlarged head, the other end of which is exposed at tie opposing end of the elongate portion (e.g. bolt shaft/shank). Alternatively, the inner core(s) can comprise a conductor forming part of or connected to a capacitor, one end of the conductor being exposed at the elongate portion opposing end for electrical connection to the seal when connected. The sensing means is preferably disposed inside, and/or is fixed to, the housing so as to communicate with the inner core(s) when connected. Here, the bolt shank or other closure member elongate portion could pass through a hole in a lug to seal a container without a loop having been formed.
Preferably, the sensing means is for sensing (or during use senses) opening of the seal after closure of the seal. More preferably, the seal is for sensing (or during use senses) the integrity and/or continuity of the connection, the loop (if present) and/or a communication path or paths (e.g. optical path or electrical circuit) including (e.g. between) the sensing means and the sensed inner core(s). In this way, the seal is able to detect illicit opening of the seal effected by releasing the closure member without cutting it, as well as being able to detect cutting of or tampering with the closure member itself.
Preferably, the sensing means is disposed inside and/or fixed to the housing.
Preferably, the housing is engageable with one, two or more portions (e.g. end portions) of the closure member, such that the housing forms or encloses part of the loop when formed.
In one embodiment, one or more portions (e.g. an end portion) of the closure member are fixed to the housing, and the housing is engageable with an engaging portion (e.g. end portion) of the closure member.
Preferably, the housing comprises one or more recesses adapted to receive an end portion of the closure member.
Preferably, the housing comprises one or more locks adapted to lock one, two or mote portions (e.g. one or two end portions) of the closure member in position when said portions are engaged with the housing. The one or more locks can comprise a sacrificial latching mechanism or a releasable lock or locks (e.g. a solenoid mechanism controlled by a microprocessor).
The one or more inner cores preferably extend along substantially all or most of the length of that portion of the closure member or elongate member which is disposed outside the housing when the seal is closed and which is included in the loop when formed. This substantially prevents the closure member or elongate member being cut without also cutting the inner core(s).
Preferably, the elongate member is flexible, but it can be rigid, e.g. in the form of a hook (as in a padlock hasp, for example).
Preferably, the elongate member comprises a cable.
Preferably, the outer portion of the cable or elongate member comprises metal (e.g. steel) wire or wires. More preferably, the outer portion comprises a plurality of inter woven strands of metal (e.g. steel) wire. This material imparts strength as well as flexibility.
In one embodiment, a single inner core is provided substantially coaxial with the outer portion of the closure member or elongate member.
In another embodiment, the elongate member (e.g. a cable) comprises a plurality of interwoven major strands (e.g. comprising metal wire), one, two or more of which being inner core-containing major strands each of which comprises a major strand outer portion (e.g. comprising metal wire, e.g. a plurality of interwoven minor strands of metal wire) enclosing one of the one or more inner cores. Where two or more inner-core-containing major stands are provided, then the integrity/continuity of each inner core is sensed, i.e. sensing occurs at two cross-sectional positions of the elongate member so that tampering with/cutting the elongate member in a manner avoiding detection by the sensing means becomes even harder.
Some or all of the one or more inner cores can comprise an inner loop extending outward from a or the fixed portion of the closure member to at or near a or the engaging portion of the closure member and back to the fixed portion. This is particularly preferred where the closure member is an elongate member (e.g. comprising a cable) including a plurality of interwoven major strands (e.g. as described above), a first strand comprising one inner core forming the outward portion of the inner loop, and a second strand comprising one inner core forming the backward portion of the inner loop. Remaining strands can be dummies containing inner cores not connected to the sensing means.
These embodiments are is harder to tamper with without detection as a person stripping the member does not know which strands are live and should be bypassed before cutting the member.
In an especially preferred embodiment of the invention, the one or more inner cores comprise one or more optical fibres, the sensing means comprises one, two or more optical detectors for sensing the integrity and/or continuity of some or all of the one or more optical fibres by detecting optical signals transmitted therealong, and the seal additionally comprises one, two or more optical sources for emission and transmission of optical signals into/along those of the one or more optical fibres which can be sensed. The optical detector(s) sense the optical properties of the optical fibre(s), which properties will change if the fibre(s) are cut or otherwise tampered with.
The above embodiment has the advantage that it is very hard to bypass the optical fibre core without changing the optical properties of the core radically, if such a bypass is possible at all. Tampering with or cutting the closure member is therefore almost always detected. This is favorably compared to the Dallas Semiconductor device in which the electrical continuity of the conducting core of the coaxial cable may be maintained by bypassing the core before cutting the cable (see above). A second advantage is that as there are no electrical contacts between the optical fibre(s) and the detector(s) or source(s), the seal is less susceptible to electronic noise or being damaged by deliberate voltage spikes being applied to the elongate member.
Preferably, the optical source(s) and/or optical detector(s) are part of the loop.
Preferably, the one or more optical fibres comprise an optical core of transparent optical material and an outer cladding enclosing the optical core. The transparent optical core preferably has a refractive index which varics from the inside to the outside of the optical core (e.g. a graded or stepped refractive index). This achieves internal reflection of an optical signal passing along. Preferably, the outer cladding comprises plastic (e.g. flexible plastic). The outer cladding is preferably opaque (e.g. black). The materials and methods of manufacture of the optical fibre are known to the skilled person.
Preferably, the ends of some or all of the one or more optical fibres are exposed at the surface of the closure member for communication with the optical detector(s) and/or optical source(s). Preferably, a first end of each optical fibre is exposed at a first end portion of the closure member and a second end of each optical fibre is exposed at a second end portion of the closure member.
Preferably, the seal comprises two means for both sensing and emitting optical signals (i.e. two combined optical sources/detectors) positioned for communication with opposing ends of some or all of the one or more optical fibres. This arrangement allows an optical signal to be transmitted in two directions along the relevant optical fibres, maximising the difficulty of detectionless tampering.
Whether or not optical fibres are used, the seal preferably comprises a microprocessor for receiving and processing data output by the sensing means relating to the integrity and/or continuity of the one or more inner cores (and preferably also relating to opening of the seal after closure) and for outputting said data and/or related data regarding the security status of the seal when required. The microprocessor is preferably suitable or adapted (e.g. via a suitable program) to receive and process the integrity/continuity data at different times, to compare each set of received data with one, some or all of the initial set or sets of integrity/continuity data obtained immediately after arming (or soon, e.g. 0-10 min e.g. 0-1 min, thereafter), and to detect tampering by detecting a difference between the initial post-arming data and data received after tampering (e.g. that representing a significant change in the optical and/or electrical properties of the closure member).
The microprocessor preferably also controls the production of conditions required for the sensing means to sense the integrity and/or continuity of the core(s) (and preferably also opening of the seal) at different times (preferably at regular intervals). For example, where the one or more inner cores comprise one or more optical fibres and optical source(s) are present, the microprocessor controls optical signal emission from the optical source(s) into the optical fibre(s). The microprocessor may also control the lock(s).
Preferably, a clock is provided so that times of sealing/locking, arming, disarming, scanning by distant devices, and/or tampering may be detected.
Preferably, the microprocessor is connected. to a memory for recording said integrity/continuity data Preferably, the memory is suitable for recording a unique identification number of the seal, the contents of a container secured by the seal, the times and dates on which the seal was closed, locked and/or armed, and/or the times and dates on which tampering of the seal was detected.
The microprocessor can be programmed to take the actions which it is suitable for taking. A program can be provided for this purpose.
The microprocessor and other electrical components are preferably powered by an electrical power source, preferably a battery (e.g. a lithium battery for long life). The power source is preferably internal to the housing, and may be either permanently sealed within the housing or accessible and/or replaceable, e.g. by maeans of a removable cover allowing access to and replacement of the power source. Having a power source, the seal is able to continually sense its own security state, unlike passive transponder seals which arc only able to do so when they are energised by a scanning device.
Preferably, the seal comprises a transmitter controllable by the microprocessor and capable of receiving integrity/continuity data and/or related security status data from the microprocessor, said transmitter being able to transmit signals containing said data to a reading and/or programming device distant or separate from the seal.
The transmitter is preferably able to transmit signals comprising electromagnetic radiation, more preferably visible and/or infrared (IR) radiation. The use of visible/IR communication gives additional security from eavesdroppers when compared to radio frequency (RF). In addition, IR/visible radiation is much more directional than RE, being given out and received within a restricted cone, and this allows a distant reading device more easily to locate which IR/visible transmitting seal is transmitting where several such seals are present, or to distinguish between several such seals each transmitting simultaneously.
Preferably, the seal comprises a detector for detecting signals from a reading and/or programming device distant or separate from the seal. Preferably, for the same reasons as above, the detector is able to detect signals comprising electromagnetic radiation, more preferably visible and/or infrared radiation.
Preferably, the seal is programmed such that when armed the transmitter emits signals (e.g. beacon signals) intermittently, the signals preferably being emitted at regular intervals (e.g. of about 0.1 to 1 second), though signals at random intervals within a fixed (e.g. 0.8-1.2 sec) time range may enhance security in certain applications. The intermittent transmission saves power and the beacon signals allow a distant reading and/or programming device searching for the signal to synchronise with the seal.
Some or all of the intermittently transmitted signals usually comprise one, two or more consecutive pulses (e.g. each about 10 xcexcs long). In some cases the number of pulses in each signal, or the time gap (e.g. 10-20 xcexcs) between each pulse, may vary depending on whether the seal has been tampered with or not. In this way a suitably programed reading and/or programming device can detect the security status of the seal without responding to it.
If the seal then detects an acceptable password in a second signal from the device within a predetermined period after one of the intermittently-transmitted signals was emitted, the seal is preferably programmed to enter subsequently into continuous two-way communication with the device (e.g. emitting detailed security status data, container contents data, etc).
Preferably, the seal is programmed such that, when armed, the seal intermittently activates (e.g. at regular intervals e.g. of about 0.1 to 1 second), senses the integrity and/or continuity of the one or more inner cores (and preferably also opening of the seal), detects whether tampering has taken place, transmits via the transmitter one of the intermittently transmitted signals, searches for an acceptable response from the device, and then if no such response is detected deactivates until the next time for re-activation occurs. In this way, the armed seal spends most of its time de-activated, only activating briefly for self-sensing, tamper detection, transmission and searching. This saves power and prolongs the life of the power source (e.g. battery).
There is an alternative to using one or more optical fibres as the one or more inner cores of the closure member.
In this alternative embodiment, he one or more inner cores comprise one or more inner conductors connected or connectable to a terminal of an electrical power, source, the one or more inner conductors being electrically insulated from each other and from the outer portion of the closure member;
the outer portion comprising a conductor connected or connectable to the opposing terminal of the power source;
the outer portion and the one or more inner conductors forming a capacitor or capacitors capable of storing charge provided by the power source;
and wherein the sensing means comprises a means for measuring charge and/or discharge characteristics of the capacitor or capacitors.
In this embodiment, the capacitance of the capacitor(s) depends on the length of the closure member. If the closure member were cot, then the charge/discharge characteristics of the member would change (e.g. the capacitance decreases, the decay/discharge curve changes, and the stored charge decays more quickly). The sensing means detects the change in the charge/discharge characteristics occurring during cutting.
One advantage that this embodiment has over the Dallas Semiconductor prior art device, which measures the electrical continuity of a conducting core of a coaxial cable, is demonstrated when a thief bypasses the conducting core(s) and the outer portion before cutting the cable (the closure member). In the prior art device, electrical conductivity may be maintained and detection may be avoided. In the present embodiment, bypass of the core(s) and outer portion would likely lead to a change in capacitance detectable by the sensing means.
Again, it is preferable that the closure member is an elongate member. This allows easy threading through a hole in a member to be secured (e.g. a hole in a lug in a container closure mechanism). A change in capacitance or discharge/charge characteristics is also more easily detectable when an elongate member is cut or tampered with.
Preferably, the means for measuring charge and/or discharge characteristics of the capacitor(s) is adapted to measure the capacitor voltage remaining and/or the discharge current flowing at different times during discharge. The sensing means may measure the decay of the capacitor voltage during discharge,
The one or more inner conductors and the outer portion conductor are usually connected Or connectable to their respective power source terminals indirectly, e.g. via an input/output device and/or a microprocessor.
Preferably, the microprocessor (e.g. as described above) of the seal comprises an input/output connector or connectors, connected or connectable to the capacitor(s), switchable between an output mode in which the capacitor(s) are charged up and an input mode in which the capacitor(s) are discharged into the microprocessor which senses the discharge characteristics of the capacitor(s).
Preferably, in the capacitance version of the invention, the inner conductor(s) and the conducting outer portion are connected or connectable to the power source via a portion (e.g. an end portion) of the closure member fixed to the housing, and the housing is engageable with an engaging portion (e.g. end portion) of the closure member.
The engaging portion of the closure member may be engageable with (e.g. slidably engageable within) a charge-storing portion of the housing such that the charge-storing portion contributes to the capacitance of the capacitor(s) when the engaging portion is so engaged. In this way, there will be a measurable change in capacitance if a thief releases the closure member (opens the seal) without cutting it.
The engaging end portion of the closure member or elongate member preferably carries a higher capacitance per unit length than that of the remaining portions of the closure member or elongate member. Thus, if the closure member or elongate member is cut near to the engaging end portion, the change in capacitance and charge/discharge characteristics will be significant and readily measurable by the sensing means.
Second Aspect of the Invention
According to a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of sensing the security status of an electronic seal according to the first aspect of the present invention, comprising the steps of:
(a) sensing the integrity and/or continuity of some or all of the one or more inner cores (and optionally also a communication path or paths including the sensing means and the sensed inner core(s)) at a certain time after closure and arming of the seal; and
(b) if the integrity and/or continuity of any of the sensed core(s) (or optionally the path or paths) has been compromised, recording that fact and/or that tampering has occurred.
Preferably, the method comprises the additional steps of:
(c) comparing the integrity and/or continuity data obtained in step (a) with previously recorded data representative of or obtainable from the sensed core or cores when in an integral state and optionally also from the sensed path or paths when continuous;
(d) detecting whether or not the data obtained in step (a) differs from the compared previously recorded data in a predefined manner and/or by more than a predefined extent; and
(e) if the data obtained in step (a) does so differ, recording that fact and/or that tampering has occurred and/or that the integrity/continuity has been compromised.
In step (c), the previously recorded data can comprise data with which the seal is provided without having been generated by self-sensing by the seal of the core(s) and optionally the path(s) (e.g. pre-programmed data).
Preferably, however, in step (c), the previously recorded data comprises that obtained at a defined preceding time after closure and arming of the seal.
In these ways, the method allows sensing of whether or not the properties (e.g. electrical and/or optical properties) of the closure member core(s), and optionally also ale communication pat(s), have changed significantly from when the seal was secured/closed and armed. Such a change will usually indicate tampering has occurred.
Preferably, in step (c), the previously recorded data comprises some or all of the initial set or sets of integrity/continuity data obtained immediately after arming or soon (e.g. less than 10 minutes or less than one minute) thereafter. This ensures that the basis for comparison is when the seal was in a secure untampered state.
Preferably, step (a) comprises sensing the integrity, continuity and/or optical properties of one or more optical fibres comprised in the one or more inner cores. This optical sensing method has the advantages of difficulty of by-passing and of low susceptibility to electronic damage as described above.
More preferably, step (a) comprises sensing the integrity, continuity and/or optical properties of one, two or more optical paths, each optical path including one of the one or more optical fibres, and an optical detector with which that optical fibre in optical communication.
Optionally, some or all of the paths can include a medium between that optical fibre and the optical detector allowing said optical communication. The medium can comprise a body of gas (e.g. air) and/or one or more transparent solid materials (e.g. covering the detector). The optical detector is preferably part of the loop (if present). In these ways, there is sensing not only of the integrity of the optical fibre(s) but also of the continuity of the optical path(s) or loop formed when the seal is closed. Therefore, not only cutting of or tampering with the closure member but also illicit opening of the seal without tampering with the closure member can be detected.
Even more preferably, step (a) comprises transmitting an optical signal from an optical source forming part of the seal into one portion (e.g. end portion) of some or all of the one or more optical fibres, and detecting whether or not a signal is received by the optical detector via another portion (e.g. end portion) of those fibre(s).
Two or more optical paths may be defined by two or more optical fibres communicating with the same optical detector.
In an alternative embodiment, step (a) comprises sensing the charge and/or discharge characteristics of a capacitor or capacitors comprised in the closure member.
The characteristics of the capacitor(s) can be as described hereinabove in the relevant embodiment of the seal.
Preferably, the method comprises measuring the capacitor voltage remaining and/or the discharge current flowing at different times during discharge. In this way, a decay curve is measured.
Preferably, the method comprises charging up the capacitor(s), and allowing the capacitor(s) to discharge while measuring the discharge characteristics of the capacitor(s).
Irrespective of which sensing embodiment is used, sensing the integrity/continuity can occur at regular intervals (e.g. of about 0.1 to 1 second).
Preferably, the method also comprises the seal transmitting signals intermittently to or for receipt by a reading and/or programming device distant or separate from the seal. The intermittent transmission saves power (e.g. maximising battery life).
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals comprise beacon (guide) signals. Those allow a distant reading and/or programming device searching for the signal to synchronize with the seal.
xe2x80x9cTransmitxe2x80x9d can include xe2x80x9cemitxe2x80x9d or xe2x80x9csend outxe2x80x9d without necessarily implying receipt by the device.
More preferably, the signals transmitted intermittently comprise electromagnetic radiation from a transmitter comprised in the seal.
Even more preferably, for additional security and directionality, the signals transmitted intermittently comprise visible and/or infrared radiation, and/or the transmitter is adapted to transmit visible and/or infrared radiation.
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals are transmitted at regular intervals (e.g. of about 0.1 to 1 second). This aids synchronization. Alternatively, the intermittently-transmitted signals are transmitted at random or irregular intervals within a fixed time range (e.g. 0.8-1.2 sec); this may enhance security in certain applications).
Some or all of the intermittently-transmitted signals usually comprise one, two or more consecutive pulses (e.g. each about 10 xcexcs long). In some cases the number of pulses in each signal, or the time gap (e.g. 10-20 xcexcs) between each pulse, may vary depending on whether the seal has been tampered with or not. In this way a suitably programmed reading and/or programming device can detect the security status of the seal without responding to it.
Preferably, the method comprises activating the seal before steps (a) and (b) or (a) to (e), transmitting one of the intermittently transmitted signals, and deactivating the seal until the next time for re-activation occurs. This saves power. More preferably, the activation, sensing, transmission and deactivation occurs at regular intervals. This aids synchronisation by the distant reading and/or programming device.
Preferably, the method comprises searching for a second signal (egg in reply to one of the intermittently-transmitted signals) transmitted from the reading and/or programming device.
Preferably, for security and directionality, the searching step utilises a visible and/or infrared detector.
Preferably, the searching step takes place during a predetermined period after transmission of one of the intermittently-transmitted signals by the seal and before deactivation of the seal. More preferably, the searching step lasts 1 xcexcs to 100 ms, more preferably 1 xcexcs to 10 ms. This minimises the time during which the seal is activated, and saves power.
Preferably, if the second signal from the reading and/or programming device is detected, then the second signal received is recorded and/or if the second signal is acceptable deactivation is delayed until communication between the seal and the device is completed.
Preferably, the method of sensing includes receipt by the seal of a second signal from the device containing a password device, checking by the seal that the device password is acceptable, and subsequently transmitting a third signal containing password-protected data stored by the seal (e.g. security status data) from the seal to the device only if the password is acceptable. This is for security reasons. The data transmitted in the third signal is usually determined by the security level of the password received from the device.
Usually, the transmission of the third signal will form part of a continuous two-way communication between the sca1 and the device.
Preferably, the signals transmitted intermittently and/or the third signal is/are encrypted, e.g. using rolling encryption.
Third Aspect of the Invention
According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic seal comprising:
a housing;
a closure member cooperable with the housing to form a connection to close the seal; and a transmitter for transmitting signals containing data relating to the seal to a reading and/or programming device distant or separate from the seal.
Preferably, the seal comprises means for sensing the integrity and/or continuity of the closure member.
Preferably, the connection is formed by formation of a closed loop including part or all of the closure member. The sensing means is preferably for sensing opening of the seal after closure, more preferably for sensing the integrity and/or continuity of the connection, the loop (if present) and/or a communication path or paths including (e.g. between) the sensing means and the closure member.
Preferably, the closure member is an elongate member (e.g. comprising a cable).
The transmitter is preferably able to transmit signals comprising electromagnetic radiation, more preferably visible and/or infrared radiation. Visible/IR signals give additional security from eavesdroppers and are more directional than RF signals, as discussed above.
Preferably, the seal is programmed such that when armed the transmitter emits signals (e.g. beacon signals) intermittently, preferably at regular intervals (e.g. about every 0.1 to 1 second). This allows the device to synchronise with it and saves power.
Preferably, the seal is programmed such that when armed, the transmitter emits a third signal containing password-protected data (e.g. data relating to the security status of the seal, the time(s) of any tampering, container contents data, etc) only after receipt of a second signal from the device containing a password acceptable to the seal.
Preferably, the seal is programmed such that, when armed, the seal intermittently activates, senses the integrity and/or continuity of the closure member (and preferably also the path(s)), detects whether tampering has taken place, transmits via the transmitter one of the intermittently transmitted signals, searches for an acceptable response from the devicc, and then if no such response is detected deactivates until the next time for re-activation occurs. In this way, the armed seal spends most of its time de-activated, only activating briefly for self-sensing, detection and transmission. This saves power and prolongs the life of the power source (e.g. battery).
Preferably, the closure member comprises an outer portion enclosing one or more inner cores and the sensing means is for sensing the integrity and/or continuity of some or all of the one or more inner cores.
Other preferable features of the third aspect of the invention are as described hereinabove, being preferable features of the first aspect of the invention, all necessary changes being made.
Fourth Aspect of the Invention
According to a fourth aspect of the present invention there is provided a method of communication for a seal as defined in the first or third aspects of the invention comprising transmitting signals intermittently from a transmitter forming part of the seal to or for receipt by a reading and/or programing device distant or separate from he seal. This saves power (e.g. maximising battery life) compared to a continuous transmission.
xe2x80x9cTransmitxe2x80x9d can include xe2x80x9cemitxe2x80x9d or xe2x80x9csend outxe2x80x9d without necessarily implying receipt by the device or similar.
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals comprise beacon signals (guide signals). These allow a distant reading and/or programming device searching for the beacon signals to synchronise with the seal.
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals comprise electromagnetic radiation, more preferably visible and/or infrared radiation. Visible/IR signals give additional directionality and security from eavesdroppers.
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals are transmitted at regular intervals This helps the device to synchronise with it.
Alternatively, the intermittently-transmitted signals may be transmitted at irregular or random intervals within a fixed time range (e.g. 0.8-1.2 sec).
Preferably, the signals are transmitted at intervals (regular or otherwise) of about 0.1 to 1 second. This is desirable to minimise power drain (which becomes significant for transmission at less than 0.1 second intervals) while also eliminating the risk of a dextrous thief opening and closing the seal between transmissions (which is possible for intervals of greater than about 1 second).
Some or all of the intermittently-transmitted signals usually comprise one, two or more consecutive pulses (e.g. each about 10 xcexcs long). In some cases the number of pulses in each signal, or the time gap (e.g. 10-20 xcexcs) between each pulse, may vary depending on whether the seal has been tampered with or not. In this way a suitably programmed reading and/or programming device can detect the security status of the seal without responding to it.
Preferably, the method comprises sensing the integrity and/or continuity of the closure member, detecting whether tampering has taken place, and then transmitting one of the intermittently-transmitted signals.
Preferably, the method comprises activating the seal before transmission of one of the intermittently-transmitted signals (and optionally before sensing) and de-activating the seal after transmission. Even more preferably, the process is repeated several times, preferably at regular intervals (e.g. of about 0.1 to 1 second).
In this way, the armed seal spends most of its time de-activated, only activating briefly for self-sensing, detection and/or transmission. This saves power and prolongs the life of the power source.
Preferably, the method of communication includes transmitting a second signal (preferably an IR or visible signal) from the device to the seal (e.g. in reply to the seal), preferably during a predetermined period (e.g. 1 xcexcs-100 ms, e.g. 1 xcexcs-10 ms) after transmission by the seal of one of the intermittently-transmitted signals and before deactivation of the seal.
More preferably, the second signal from the device to the seal contains a password of the device, and the method of communication includes checking by the seal that the device password is acceptable, and subsequently transmitting a third signal containing password-protected data stored by the seal (e.g. security status data) from the seal to the device only if the password is acceptable This is for security reasons.
The data transmitted ill the third signal is usually determined by the security level of the password received from the device.
Usually, the transmission of the third signal will form part of a continuous two-way communication between the seal and the device.
Preferably, the third signal contains data relating to the seal.
Preferably, the third signal contains data relating to the security status of the seal (e.g. data regarding the integrity/continuity of the closure member, or data derived therefrom), and/or the time(s) of any tampering.
Alternatively or additionally, at the same or different times, the third signal can contain the time(s) of arming and/or locking of the seal, a seal identification number, and/or the contents of a container secured by the seal. Time(s) of reading of the seal by reading device(s) may also be transmitted.
Preferably, the intermittently-transmitted signals and/or the third signal is/are encrypted, e.g. using rolling encryption.
Other preferable features of the method of communication are as defined in the preferable or essential features of the other aspects of the invention, all necessary changes being made.
Fifth and Sixth Aspects of the Invention
According to a fifth aspect of the invention, there is provided a security system comprising
(i) an electronic seal according to the first or third aspects of the invention, and
(ii) an electronic reading and/or programming device distant or separate from the seal for communication with the seal.
According to a sixth aspect of the invention, there is provided an electronic reading and/or programming device suitable or adapted to (e.g. programmed to) communicate with a distant or separate electronic seal according to the first or third aspects of the invention.
Communication can be one-way in either direction, or two-way.
In the fifth or sixth aspects of the invention the device can be a programing device (e.g. arming device) capable of arming or disarming the seal and/or locking or unlocking the seal. This programming device preferably is adapted to itself be disarmed on arming and/or locking of the seal by receipt of a signal from the seal which erases a password of the device, receipt and recognition of the device password by the seal being necessary to arm and/or lock the seal. This embodiment represents a cheap single-use item which can be widely distributed at goods distribution depots and is simple to use. Preferably, this type of device and the seal each have an outer conducting surface (e.g. sensor surface) capable of being brought into contact with each other so that signals can pass therebetween.
Preferably, the device is a reading device comprising a device detector for receiving transmissions from the seal and a device microprocessor for receiving and processing data relating to the security status of the seal. This allows distant/remote monitoring of the security status of the seal.
More preferably, the device is a reading and programming device which also comprises a device transmitter for transmitting signals to the seal, and wherein the device microprocessor is for controlling (e.g. arming or dis-arming) the seal via the device transmitter. This provides a versatile device capable of both controlling and monitoring the seal.
Most preferably, the device is programmed to search on instruction for beacon (guide) signals transmitted intermittently from the seal and, if such a signal is detected by the device detector, to transmit a second signal (e.g. including a password) via the device transmitter to the seal within a predetermined period after detection.
The device microprocessor can be programmed to take the actions which it is suitable for taking.
Preferably, the reading and/or programming device also includes input means (e.g. a keypad) for input of instructions by an operator of the device and/or output means (e.g. a display) for output of data to the operator.
Preferably, the device detector is able to detect visible and/or infrared radiation. Preferably, the device transmitter is able to transmit visible and/or infrared radiation The use of IR/visible communication increases security and directionality compared with R.F.
Preferably, the reading and/or programming device has an electronic memory containing or recordable with a password and/or a unique device identification number for transmission to and/or recordal by the seal.
Preferably, the device comprises an information input means (e.g. a connector or detector) for receiving encrypted information from a remote computer. This allows the random generation of passwords and codewords by the (secure) remote computer and their transmission from the computer to the device without their being known to any human operators. This eliminates collusion.